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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although economists model decision makers as isolated individuals, within firms and 
organizations decisions are often taken through deliberations in groups and committees. Many of 
those decisions involve options with different degrees of risk. In the last decade economists have 
produced a growing number of studies on this issue.   
In an experiment we study decision-making procedures of individuals versus groups in a series 
of choices between a safe and a risky option. How do groups aggregate individual preferences 
when members are initially in disagreement? In the laboratory, one can design a clean set up, 
which is free from external confounding factors, in order to better answer this question. Eliciting 
risk attitudes for groups was initiated in management and social psychology (Stoner, 1961; 
Pruitt, 1971; Lamm and Myers, 1978) and recently involved also economists (i.e.  Masclet et al., 
2009, Baker et al., 2008). When a group decides whether to enter a lottery or not, there is no 
obvious correct choice and individuals may legitimately differ in their proposals due to their 
preferences. For this reason the psychological literature on groups and teams would classify this 
task as “judgmental”. On the contrary, “intellective” tasks have a demonstrably correct solution. 
For instance, Cooper and Kagel (2005) study a strategic market entry task, which is mostly 
intellective. The only intellective aspect of our lottery task is that choices should be coherent.1 
Earlier studies in social psychology introduced the concepts of risky shifts and cautious shifts. 
“Risky shift” denotes situations where groups make riskier decisions than individuals, and 
“cautious shift” otherwise. Depending on the study, the results reported in the literature are 
sometimes in one direction and sometimes in the other. One reason for this diversity of findings 
may be the presence of important, but overlooked, differences in the design and methodology 
among studies. Hence, we first proceed by mapping the approach of some recent experimental 
 3
studies. In the present work, we designed group interaction rules to facilitate information 
exchange, to encourage participation by all members, and to focus the interaction on how to 
aggregate individual preferences. The main aim is to understand in detail how groups of three 
members deal with disagreement. Our design is novel because there is a written record of the 
communication among group members to understand internal dynamics and to correlate with 
actual differences in outcomes. It is the first, among the studies of group risk attitude, where 
before the discussion, each participant must post her proposal, a feature that saves discussion 
time and prevents shy members from being silenced. This piece of information allows us to 
perform an individual-level analysis of preference aggregation. Moreover, in case of 
disagreement, the minority has veto power over the group decision. Like many other studies, we 
call for a unanimous decision but, unlike others, here the sanction for disagreement is severe: no 
choice and zero earnings. In the field this rule is observed in international bodies that do not take 
a stand on an issue when they do not reach consensus, or in organizations that do not participate 
in an auction unless the board of directors agree on a bid.  This rule creates a common interest 
within the group to communicate and reach a decision. Other default rules do not generate this 
positive group dynamic. 
Through the group process, we find that lottery choices become more coherent and closer to risk 
neutrality. In resolving disagreement the proposal of the majority did not always prevail. It 
prevailed more often when its proposal was closer to risk neutrality.  There are some interesting 
personality and demographic effects, which we report in detail below. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 
describes experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section focuses on four recent papers that examine decisions made by groups facing risky 
choices, Harrison et al. (2005) Shupp and Williams (2008), Baker et al. (2008), Masclet et al. 
(2009). Table 1 presents a design comparison with the present study. All studies, including ours, 
compare lottery choices of groups of three members with individuals choosing in isolation. In 
both treatments subjects face the same set of lottery choices (ranging from 8 to 15) and identical 
monetary incentives. At the end of the session, only one of the lotteries is randomly selected for 
payment. Shupp and Williams (2008), Baker et al. (2008), Masclet et al. (2009) all find that 
groups are more risk averse than individuals. On the contrary, Harrison et al. (2005) report no 
group effect. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Existing studies exhibit a significant diversity in design along a number of dimensions (Table 1). 
The most interesting differences pertain to group interaction. First, Masclet et al. (2009) 
randomly change group composition for each lottery choice while the others keep it fixed. This 
generates different dynamic incentives to “tune-in” with the group. Second, communication 
ranges from none, to anonymous chat rooms, to face-to-face interaction. We know from 
experiments on social dilemmas that communication can have profound effects on choices.2 With 
lottery choices, the issue is not to overcome free riding but rather to aggregate preferences. 
Hence, communication fulfills other aims. 
In all studies in Table 1, the instructions call for a unanimous group decision except in Harrison 
et al. (2005) that employed a majority voting rule. Within the consensus call, there are 
substantive differences in the default choice when a group does not reach unanimity. Although 
often downplayed in experiments with groups, this aspect is theoretically extremely important. 
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Among the criteria to resolve disagreement there are random choice, majority rule, mean choice 
and no choice. Each default rule implicitly sets different incentives for group discussion, which 
includes incentives to “talk” and to “listen.” Let us adopt the standard assumption that subjects 
have well-defined preferences toward risk and assume that they are informed about the intended 
choices of others in their group. The last column of Table 1 lists whether a subject would benefit 
from successfully persuading others to change their intended choice (“talk”). Except Shupp and 
Williams (2007), all studies asked the subjects to make a binary decision between a safe and a 
risky option. Thus the initial opinions must be a majority of two versus a minority of one.3 All 
default rules exhibit positive incentives to talk, except majority rule, where if you are already 
part of the majority you do not have any incentive to persuade others. Another crucial aspect is 
the incentive to “listen.” The default rules implemented in the previous studies may not generate 
positive incentives to listen (Table 1). Of course, there may be other types of advantages from 
listening to others besides those considered in Table 1. Communication may enhance the 
understanding of the task as well as learning about the intended choices of others and so benefit 
everyone in the group. Table 1 considers incentives under the more narrow view of rational 
subjects endowed with precise utility functions, which are common knowledge. 
Like some of the experiments, we employed a within-subject design which allows a more direct 
comparison of choices in isolation (I) and in group (G) but may exhibit order effects. To control 
for order effects, Masclet et al. (2009) run sessions with I-G and G-I sequences and do not find 
any. Others employed a between-subject design, which relies instead on an assumption of similar 
preferences of the two experimental samples for I and for G treatments. 
Other experimental studies have groups facing more challenging choices under risk. Rockenbach 
et al. (2007) compare individuals and groups with respect to choices among alternative financial 
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investments and find that groups accumulate significantly higher expected values at a 
significantly lower total risk. Charness et al. (2007) study choice monotonicity over lottery and 
Bayesian updating by individuals and groups. They find that social interaction reduces violation 
rates and thus groups make substantially fewer errors than individuals and the error rate 
decreases with group size. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Each session had four parts plus a questionnaire and involved 15 participants. Overall 120 
students participated in the experiment. In part 1, we measured subjects’ risk attitude with fifteen 
binary choices between lotteries. In part 2 subjects were randomly divided into groups of three 
persons and faced the same task as in part 1.  The per-capita expected payoff in part one was 
equal to that in part two. We report results of parts 3 and 4, which involved a different task, in 
Casari et al. (2009). The overall incentive structure was similar to that in Holt and Laury (2002). 
Subjects chose between a “safe” Option A and a “risky” Option B. The payoff for Option A was 
deterministic (50 tokens) and the payoff for Option B was either 150 or 0. On the first decision 
the probability of the high payoff (150) for Option B was zero.  In subsequent choices, the 
probability of the high payoff increased by 1/20 each line, 0, 1/20, …, 14/20. A risk neutral 
person would choose option A in lotteries one through seven and then switch to option B in 
lottery eight. Risk seeking agents may switch to option B earlier than lottery 7 and risk averse 
agents may switch later than lottery 7. Any rational agent should choose option A over option B 
in the first lottery (50 vs. 0 francs always) and later on eventually switch to option B. Multiple 
switches would be a signal of confusion. We paid only one of the fifteen decisions, chosen 
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randomly at the end of the session. Random choices were all implemented through drawings 
from a bingo cage. 
In part two there were five groups in each session. There were a proposal phase, a chat phase, 
and a group choice phase. Everyone simultaneously made an individual proposal about each of 
the fifteen lottery choices.  Then any line with disagreement was highlighted for all three group 
members to see. At this point, participants could switch to a chat window and had two minutes to 
send free-format messages to others in their group. We asked participants to follow two basic 
rules: (1) to be civil to one another and do not use profanities, and (2) not to identify themselves 
in any manner. Messages were recorded. In the chat window subjects received an id number 
from 1 to 3 based on the order in which they sent messages in that specific period. After the chat 
stage, everyone had to submit a choice for the group decision. If the choices of all three group 
members were identical for a specific decision line (unanimity), then we had a group choice. If 
there was unanimity on all fifteen choices, then part 2 was over. Otherwise, the line(s) with 
disagreement was (were) highlighted and all three group members were asked to submit their 
new proposals. If there was still disagreement, there was another, final round of proposals. At 
this point part 2 was over even if disagreement remained. The design followed a default rule of 
“no choice:” if the group reached no unanimous decision, no decision was placed, so earnings 
were zero for everyone in the group. Such a default rule generates positive incentives both to talk 
and to listen to others in the chat. In fact, these incentives are the highest among the studies listed 
in Table 1. With disagreement between a safe and a risky option, a default rule with random 
selection induces a game where a subject’s dominant strategy is to choose her most preferred 
option. Instead, a default rule of “no choice” induces a battle-of-the sexes game where a subject 
would always switch choice to avoid a disagreement outcome. We paid only one of the fifteen 
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decisions, chosen randomly at the end of the session. Random choices were all implemented 
through drawings from a bingo cage. If for the line selected the group was still in disagreement, 
then the group earned zero for part 2. Overall, there were 40 groups and 600 group decisions 
taken. 
We distributed written instructions and read them aloud, taking questions as they arose. The 
experiment was performed with a z-tree application (Fishbacher, 2007). No person participated 
in more than one experimental session. We guaranteed a minimum payment of $5. We converted 
each experimental token to an actual dollar at the rate of $0.03. Including all parts, a session 
lasted on average about two hours and average earnings per person were about $20.  We 
conducted eight experimental sessions at Purdue University (USA) between 25 September and 
28 October, 2007. Participants were recruited from the undergraduate campus population by 
email. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
We report five main results. 
 
Result 1: The monotonicity of lottery choices improved from the individual to the group 
treatment. 
We employed a table format to elicit risk attitude, where a subject with monotonic risk 
preferences would choose option A in decision 1 and then eventually switch forever to option B 
at one later decision. A subject who switched from A to B more than once, or who switched from 
B back to A, is classified as non-monotonic, which is taken as a proxy of confusion or 
irrationality.4 Recorded levels of monotonicity in the experiment were very high, ranging from 
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87.5% for individual choices (105/120) to 95.0% for group choices (38/40) (one-sided t test, 
m=120, n=40, p-value=0.034). A small portion of this improvement may be attributed to task 
learning, but we find no significant difference in monotonicity levels between individual 
proposals and individual choices (90.0% vs. 87.5%, one-sided t test, m=120, n=120, p-value= 
0.27). In part two, individual proposals do not have significantly different level of monotonicity 
in lottery choices than group final decisions (90.0% vs. 95.0%, one sided t test, m=120, n=40, p-
value= 0.32). 
 
Result 2: Group choices were closer to risk neutrality than individual choices. In 
particular, group choices exhibited a risky shift from individual choices.  
[Table 2 and Figure 1 about here] 
Support for Result 2 comes from Table 2 and Figure 1. We discuss separately lotteries 1-7 from 
lotteries 8-15. In lotteries 1-7 only a risk seeking agent would choose the risky option B. 
Differences here were rather limited because risk seeking behavior was rare: on average, only 
2% of individual choices and 0.4% of group choices were for B. In these lotteries, groups were 
less risk seeking than individuals. Most of the differences came from lotteries 8-15 where a risk 
neutral agent would choose the risky option B. In these lotteries, groups were more risky than 
individuals. On average, 57.4% of individual choices and 61.7% of group choices were for B. 
Group choices are more risky than individual choices (p-value<0.05).5 Recall that part one 
elicited individual choices while part two elicited individual proposals and group choices. 
Although this fixed order may have had some impact on results, order effects are unlikely to 
explain the risky shift.  First, we stated in part one of the instructions that the tasks in part one 
and two were the same lottery choices. Hence subjects could optimize considering the overall 
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level of uncertainty. Second, little evidence can be traced from a comparison of the individual 
choices in part one with the individual proposals in part two. We elicited individual proposals 
before any communication could take place in the group setting and report only minimal 
differences with part one choices, which helps to rule out large order effects. As mentioned after 
Result 1, some of this difference is simply a correction of non-monotonic behavior. Third, 
Masclet et al. (2009) explicitly studied order effects but did not find any. 
Result 2 may be a consequence of the default rule adopted in the design. The “no choice” rule 
may have generated a different group dynamic. In particular an asymmetry in payoffs between 
risk averse and risk neutral subjects in the negotiation over disagreement. More risk averse 
subjects may have less to lose from switching to their least preferred choice.6  
 
Result 3: When in disagreement, the majority proposal did not always prevail. It prevailed 
more often when its proposal was closer to risk neutrality. Proposals from non-monotonic 
subjects were less likely to prevail. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Support for Result 3 comes from Tables 3, 4, 5 and Figure 2. We focus explicitly on group 
decisions where there was an initial disagreement. We define disagreement as a situation where 
not all three individual proposals were equal.  All groups disagreed on at least one decision, 
77.5% found an agreement on the first round, 20% after a second or third round, and only 2.5% 
(1 group) never found complete agreement.7 On average a group disagreed on 4 lottery decisions 
(27% of decisions). The bulk of the disagreement (85%) was in lotteries 8-13, where risk 
neutrality pointed toward option B while risk averse subjects may have preferred the safer option 
A (Figure 2).  
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[Figure 2 about here] 
The analysis of disagreement is particularly interesting because one can understand the internal 
process that lead to a decision and shed light on Result 2. Given that the decision was binary, A 
or B, and a group comprised three individuals, there were only two possible patterns of 
disagreement, a majority for A (AAB) or a majority for B (ABB). Out of a total of 600, there 
were 159 group decisions with disagreement. In order to study   how disagreement was resolved 
through group interaction, we consider two possible benchmarks: the outcome with a dictator 
selected at random in the group and the outcome with majority voting. Following a random 
dictator process the proposal of the majority would prevail in 66.7% of the cases while following 
majority voting the proposal of the majority would prevail in 100% of the cases. As Table 3 
illustrates, when in disagreement, the proposal of the majority prevailed in 81.1% of the 
decisions, while the minoritarian proposal prevailed in the remaining 18.9% (two Pearson chi-
squared tests, p-value<0.01, N=159). The actual outcome is in-between a random dictator and a 
majority rule process and exhibits some interesting biases in group decision making.  
When in disagreement, 52.7% of individual proposals and 61.0% of group choices were the same 
as those of a risk neutral agent. Table 3 suggests that the proposal of the majority prevailed more 
often when its proposal was the same as that of a risk neutral agent (79/91 vs. 50/68, Pearson chi-
squared test, p-value=0.011). Hence the group interaction generated a shift toward more risk 
neutral choices. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 presents a breakdown with respect to whether the more risky proposal prevailed. Overall, 
with disagreement the more risky proposal prevailed in 54.7% of the decisions, which is slightly 
higher than predicted by a coin flip resolution of disagreement (50.0%) and higher than what is 
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expected had the proposal of the majority always prevailed (49.7%).8 In particular, when the 
majority prevailed, in 52.7% of the decisions it had the more risky position; when the minority 
prevailed, in 63.3% of the decisions it had the more risky position. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents the marginal effect from a probit regression on individual proposals. The 
dependent variable is equal to one when an individual proposal equals the actual group choice 
(hence it prevails in case of disagreement). Among the independent variables, we included some 
aspects of lottery choices, demographic and personality traits, and chat activity. The focus is on 
individual proposals in disagreement with others in the group. We will postpone the discussion 
of chat activity to Result 4 and discuss the other findings. Demographic regressors include skill, 
gender and major. Skills are proxied by the ACT/SAT scores obtained from the university 
Registrar’s Office. We have either SAT or ACT scores for 92.5% of the subjects (missing 
data=0), who are coded using the US nationwide distribution of the SAT-takers (College Board 
of Education, 2006) and ACT-takers. The threshold for high ability is being in the top quartile of 
the distribution and for low ability is being in the lower quartile. The variables are primarily 
based on SAT scores and, when missing, on ACT scores. The cutoff values are the average 
between male and female national tables.  
Another class of regressors code five personality traits using questionnaire answers. The 
personality traits are designed based on the big five inventory by John et al. (1991), 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness, and extroversion. For example one 
variable measures conscientiousness through the average rating on nine statements.9 Subjects 
circle a number 1 through 5, where 1 stands for “strongly disagree,” 2 for “disagree,” 3 for 
”neutral,” 4 for “agree,” and 5 for “strongly agree.” 
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Table 5 presents results from the same econometric specification run on five data samples. 
Column one includes all decisions with disagreement, columns two and three show a breakdown 
of the sample into cases where the majority or minority prevailed, respectively. We will later 
comment on the other columns. The results corroborate five points. First, there was a significant 
shift toward risk neutrality as stated in Result 2 (col. 1, 2 and 3).10 Second, as already discussed, 
being in a majority substantially raised the likelihood to prevail in case of group disagreement 
(col. 1). Third, subjects who are confused with the task are less likely to prevail (col. 1 and 2). 
We proxied a subject's confusion using a lottery-specific dummy for her individual choice being 
different from her proposal and a subject-specific dummy for her proposal not being monotonic. 
Forth, personality matters, in the sense that more conscientious subjects conceded more chances 
to the proposal of the minority when they were in a majority that prevailed (col. 2). Fifth, skill 
sometimes matter but not in an expected way: low skilled subjects were more likely to prevail 
(col. 2). 
 
Result 4: About one third of groups did not find agreement immediately after 
communication. Groups with high skill and science and engineering members were more 
likely to find an immediate agreement as well as those with monotonic and more extrovert 
members.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Tables 5 and 6 provide support for Result 4. Table 6 presents a probit regression on the difficulty 
of reaching a group agreement in the first attempt. Predictably, the higher the number of lotteries 
with disagreement the less likely the groups would resolve disagreement immediately. In 
addition, both skill and personality measures had an impact. Groups with members with 
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SAT/ACT score above the 75th percentile and with monotonic proposals were more likely to find 
an immediate agreement. Groups with more extrovert members were also more likely to find an 
immediate agreement (also more conscientious members, albeit at a 10% significance level). 
There was also a strong effect of Science and Engineering although no gender effect was 
recorded. We will comment on the impact of chat activity in Result 5. 
When disagreement persists after the communication stage, group processes may change 
substantially. In column four of Table 5 we restrict the sample to those groups who required 
multiple attempts before converging toward unanimity. Those groups faced an emergency 
situation since they would have obtained zero payoffs if they hadn’t reached an agreement after 
three attempts. When disagreement is not resolved immediately, our previous conclusions need 
qualification. Putting forward a risk-neutral proposal is no longer important in the emergency 
situation (risk neutral proposal prevailed in 95 out of 109 in one attempt vs. 30 out of 50 in 
multiple attempts); different personality traits prevailed: extroversion has now a significant 
impact while conscientiousness is no longer important; finally, proposals from Science and 
Engineering majors were more likely to prevail. 
 
Result 5: Chat activity was intense, growing with the level of disagreement and aimed at 
finding consensus. The amount and timing of chat messages help to predict group choices. 
Figures 3, 4 and Tables 5 and 6 provide support for Result 5. Every one of the 120 subjects 
intervened in the two minutes of chat time. On average a person intervened 4.3 times and wrote a 
total of 23.9 words. Hence, the average length of an intervention was rather short (5.6 words). 
Interestingly, the higher the number of decisions with disagreement the more intense was the 
chat activity, suggesting that messages were aimed at finding a common ground. With more 
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disagreements, participants intervened on average about the same number of times but with 
longer messages (Figure 3). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 4 informs about the content of the communication by giving an uncensored list of the top 
100 words employed. In the figure, the character size is proportional to frequency of use. “A” 
and “B” were the option names and were among the most frequently used. Notice numbers 1-15, 
whose sizes are roughly linked to how controversial that particular lottery decision was. “I” and 
“we” suggest the tension between individual and group. Overall, the words employed denote a 
very practical use of communication to reach consensus or express opinions for or against a 
choice. This content analysis did not rely on human coders, as Cooper and Kagel (2005) but on 
quantitative statistics on the text, which delivered interesting results. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The probit regressions in Tables 5 and 6 shows that chat activity helps to predict how groups 
resolved disagreement. In Table 5 four variables summarized chat activity: who talked first, who 
talked last, number of words written by the subject and total number of words written by the 
other two people in the group. Even without analyzing the content of the messages, one can see 
the effects on whose choice prevailed in group decision making. The persuasion effort as 
measured by the number of words written paid off in the expected direction. Not voicing your 
own reasons lowered someone's chances of determining the group decision. In particular a 
subject with a majority proposal was more likely to be the first to express opinions and to render 
the majority proposal to prevail.  A subject in a minoritarian position had chances to convince 
the other two if she wrote longer messages. This evidence is consistent with Eliaz et al. (2007)’s 
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theory which predicts that the majority prevails through greater voice and larger group size and, 
whenever the minority prevails, voice more than compensates for the group size.  
In Table 6 four other variables that are based on the count of the number of words summarized 
the chat activity: overall activity in the group, difference in activity between the most and least 
active member in the group, length of the last intervention and of the second-to-last intervention. 
We report two major effects of chat activity on the difficulty of reaching a group agreement in 
the first attempt. First, groups with more words written in the chat can sort out disagreement 
more quickly. Second, a large inequality in chat activity among group members and more words 
in the second to last intervention correlate with more difficulties of reaching a consensual group 
choice. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We study group decision making with the aim to understand how small groups resolve 
disagreement when facing a safe versus a risky option. We present experimental evidence both at 
the aggregate and at the individual level. 
In the aggregate, we report that group decisions generate a “risky shift” in comparison to 
individual decisions. This shift occurs because group choices were 4.3 percentage points more 
frequently closer to risk neutrality than individual choices; groups made choices that were less 
risk averse than those of their members. In addition, group choices followed monotonicity more 
often than individual choices. These aggregate results contribute to the debate on whether group 
decision making generates a risky or a cautious shift. Shupp and Williams (2008), Baker et al. 
(2008), Masclet et al. (2009) all find that groups are more risk averse than individuals. On the 
contrary, Harrison et al. (2005) report no group effect. We put forward the explanation that the 
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attitude of group decisions over risk depends on the interaction rules and on group size. These 
conjectures spring from considering the variety of default rules adopted in the literature in case 
of group disagreement. Chat communication alone did not always generate unanimity because 
individuals may hold genuinely different stands over what risks to take. In these cases, as Baker 
et. al. (2008) note, the unanimity rule is more likely to induce more pressure toward conformity 
in groups than the majority rule. We carried out analyses of the incentives set by alternative 
default rules, which makes clear that our design gives the highest incentives to negotiate and 
reach consensual decisions within the group. In addition to formal incentives, there may be a 
behavioral group pressure to conform, which depends on members’ personality and group size. 
We did not explore differences in group sizes but conjecture that in a group of three members, a 
2-against-1 situation is qualitatively different than a disagreement in a group of two of 1-against-
1.  In our experiment, in situations of 2-against-1 the minority proposal prevailed on average in 
19% of cases. This fraction is positive but less than one third, as a random selection would 
suggest, and further reduced to 14% in case the disagreement persisted over multiple attempts to 
decide, which signals an even stronger attraction toward the opinion of the group majority.  
Lack of agreement caused an emergency situation because without unanimity in a lottery choice, 
participants’ payoff was zero for that lottery. Agreement could eventually be reached without 
further communication in a second or third attempt. In these emergency situations, the mode of 
interaction within group members changed substantially.  
We report evidence that personality and communication abilities mattered. In particular, the 
presence of extrovert and conscientious members influences group choices. Conscientious 
subject may be more willing to give-in to minimize the chances of no-choice in case of 
disagreement. Extrovert subjects were more likely to push for an immediate agreement or to 
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voice his or her proposals when in emergency situation. The patterns of communication in terms 
of amount, equality and timing significantly influence the outcome. In the experiment, the more 
one writes relative to others, the more likely is one’s opinion to prevail. Moreover, a balanced 
exchange of messages among members makes immediate agreement more likely. 
To conclude, in a group with clearly outlined individual preferences and incentives to solve 
disagreements, group decisions exhibited a shift toward risk neutrality. This "risky shift" was not 
found in other studies and likely depends on the incentives to internally negotiate an agreement. 
We conjecture that the risk attitude of group decisions is rule-specific: it depends on the 
interaction rules in place within the group. 
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VII. FIGURE CAPTION 
 
FIGURE 1: Individual versus Group risk attitude. 
FIGURE 2: Which lottery decisions were most controversial. 
FIGURE 3: Chat activity 
FIGURE 4: One hundred most frequent words in chat messages 
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1. Tasks involving other-regarding preferences are mostly judgemental tasks, e.g. Cason and 
Mui (1997) or Luhan et al. (2009). The beauty contest game is a task with both components 
(Kocher and Sutter, 2005). 
2. It has been documented in the experimental literature that pre-play face-to-face 
communication significantly improves cooperation in public good game (for instance Isaac 
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and Walker, 1988; Cason and Khan, 1999) and common-pool resource experiments under 
conditions of heterogeneity in resource endowment and payoffs (Hackett et al., 1994). 
3. Shupp and Williams (2007) asked to price each lottery and then awarded the lottery using 
an incentive compatible mechanism. The default bid without unanimity is the average of 
individual bids.  
4. Some multiple switches could also be a sign of preference indifference over a certain 
range. 
5. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of two distributions of the 
switching points from A to B with monotonic preference (n=105, m=39, p-value=0.0476). 
About 58.8% of individual proposals were for B (1.4 points more than individual choices). 
The distribution of the switching points in individual proposals does not significantly differ 
from group decisions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, n=108, m=39, p-value=0.978), neither 
from individual choices (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, n=108, m=105, p-value=0.998)   
6. Without pretence of generality, below we illustrate this point. Consider a game with two 
players with different risk attitudes who choose between a safe option S=50 and a risky 
option R= (150, p; 0, 1-p). Assume player 1 has a CRRA utility function and is risk averse, 
u(x), u’>0, u”<0 and player 2 is risk neutral, v(x)=x. Assume disagreement, i.e. player 1 
prefers S, U[S]>U[R], and player 2 prefers R, V[S]<V[R]: u(50) > p u(150) and 50 < 150 p, 
which implies that 1/3<p< u(50)/u(150). One can show that for lotteries 9-15 we have that 
V[R]/V[S] > U[S]/U[R], i.e. 3 p2 > u(50)/u(150), which holds for p>1/sqrt(3) and, given the 
actual values of p, for lotteries 9-15. There were instances of disagreement also for lotteries 
6-8. 
 25
7. The group reached agreement on 12 of the 15 lottery choices (disagreement over lotteries 
8, 9 and 10). Analyses with 159 groups (477 proposals) dropped those 3 observations while 
analysis 162 groups (486 proposals) replaced those 3 group lottery choices with the 
individual inputs in the third attempt to reach a group decision. 
8. These differences are not statistically significant. 
9. I do a thorough job. I do things efficiently. I make plans and follow through. I am a 
reliable worker. I persevere until the task is finished. I am easily distracted. I can be 
somewhat careless. I tend to be lazy. I tend to be disorganized. 
10. Table 5B in Appendix presents an alternative specification to highlight the presence of a 
risky shift. 
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TABLE 1 
Design comparison across five studies of group lottery choices 
 
 
Number 
of groups 
in the 
experime
nt 
Includes 
between-
subject 
design 
Group 
composi
tion 
across 
choices 
Default 
choice 
when no 
group 
unanimity 
Maximum  
attempts 
to reach 
group 
choice 
Every 
individual 
posts a  
non-
binding 
proposal 
Communi
cation 
Positive 
incentives 
to 
talk/listen 
to others 
Zhang and 
Casari [this 
study] 
40 no fixed 
none 
(zero 
earnings) 
3 yes chat  (2 min.) yes/yes 
Masclet et 
al., 2009 36 no random random 5 no none yes/no 
Shupp and 
Williams, 
2007 
28 yes fixed 
mean of 
individual 
bids 
1 no 
face-to-
face  
(20 min.) 
yes/no (*) 
Baker et al., 
2008 40 yes fixed 
majority 
rule 1 no 
face-to-
face 
yes for 
minority/no 
Harrison et 
al., 2005 36 no fixed 
majority 
rule 1 no none 
yes for 
minority/no 
 
 
Notes: (*) It may be “yes/yes,” a short explanation follows. Shupp and Williams (2007) asked to price each lottery 
and then awarded the lottery using an incentive compatible mechanism. The default bid without unanimity is the 
average of individual bids. An individual player may have an incentive to manipulate the group price by 
strategically over- or under-bidding in order to generate a group bid closer to her preferred level. 
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TABLE 2 
Lottery choice task 
  Option A 
Option 
 B Risk Preference 
Individual 
Choices 
Individual 
Proposals 
Group 
Choices 
Lottery 
number Payoffs Payoffs 
Probability 
of getting 
150 tokens 
Expected 
payoff of 
option B 
Range of CRRA If 
switch from A to B at 
the following lottery 
Frequency 
of choices 
for B 
Frequency 
of choices 
for B 
Frequency 
of choices 
for B 
(%) (%) (%) 
1 50 150 or 0 0 0 r<-1.73 0 0.8 0 
2 50 150 or 0 0.05 7.5 -1.73<r<-1.1 0 0 0 
3 50 150 or 0 0.1 15 -1.1<r<-0.73 1.7 0 0 
4 50 150 or 0 0.15 22.5 -0.73<r<-0.47 0 0 0 
5 50 150 or 0 0.2 30 -0.47<r<-0.27 1.7 0 0 
6 50 150 or 0 0.25 37.5 -0.27<r<-0.1 5 2.5 0 
7 50 150 or 0 0.3 45 -0.1<r<0.04 5.8 6.7 2.5 
8 50 150 or 0 0.35 52.5 0.04<r<0.16 15 20 16.7 
9 50 150 or 0 0.4 60 0.16<r<0.27 24.2 26.7 21.7 
10 50 150 or 0 0.45 67.5 0.27<r<0.36 31.7 32.5 36.7 
11 50 150 or 0 0.5 75 0.36<r<0.45 58.3 58.3 65 
12 50 150 or 0 0.55 82.5 0.45<r<0.53 68.3 67.5 80 
13 50 150 or 0 0.6 90 0.53<r<0.6 80 80 87.5 
14 50 150 or 0 0.65 97.5 0.6<r<0.66 88.3 90.8 95 
15 50 150 or 0 0.7 105 0.66<r 93.3 95 97.5 
    Percentage of monotonic decision makers 87.5 90 95 
 
Notes: Everyone should choose option A in decision 1. Risk neutral subjects would switch to option B in decision 8. 
A switch in later decisions reveals risk aversion and a switch in earlier decisions reveals risk seeking behavior. 
CRRA stands for a utility function exhibiting constant relative risk aversion. Number of individual observations for 
each line: 120. 
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TABLE 3 
Risk neutrality when disagreement 
 Majority 
prevailed 
Minority 
prevailed 
 
Majority at risk 
neutrality 79 12 
91 
(57.2%)
Minority at risk 
neutrality 50 18 
68 
(42.8%)
Totals 129 (81.1%) 
30 
(18.9%) 
159 
(100%) 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a decision a group made in a lottery in Part 2. Tables 3 includes only group 
decisions with disagreement (159/600 obs.)). The table compares individual proposals with group choice. The 
majority proposal was A when AAB and was B when ABB. 
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TABLE 4 
 Risky shift when disagreement 
 Majority 
prevailed 
Minority 
prevailed 
 
Majority more 
risky 68 11 
79 
(49.7%)
Minority more 
risky 61 19 
80 
(50.3%)
Totals 129 30 159 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a decision a group made in a lottery in Part 2. Tables 4 includes only group 
decisions with disagreement (159/600 obs.)). The table compares individual proposals with group choice. The 
majority proposal was A when AAB and was B when ABB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
TABLE 5 
Probit regression on how groups resolve disagreement 
Sample: decisions with disagreement only 
 
Dependent variable: 
1= my proposal equals group choice, 0= otherwise 
All 
 
 
 
(1) 
Majority 
prevails 
 
 
(2) 
Minority 
prevails 
 
 
(3) 
Multiple 
attempts 
before 
unanimity 
(4) 
One 
attempt 
before 
unanimity 
(5) 
Independent variables:      
My proposal was the risk neutral choice (1 or 0) 0.20* 0.14* 0.15* 0.09 0.34** 
 (0.103) (0.060) (0.063) (0.114) (0.121) 
My proposal was in the majority (1 or 0) 0.65**   0.71** 0.63** 
 (0.081)   (0.160) (0.112) 
My individual choice was different than my proposal -0.27 -0.40* 0.05 -0.38** -0.33*
 (0.138) (0.191) (0.120) (0.144) (0.158) 
My proposals were not monotonic (1 or 0) -0.29** -0.19 -0.07 -0.23 -0.32** 
 (0.074) (0.103) (0.043) (0.118) (0.116) 
Number of lottery decisions on which the group disagree -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.034) (0.011) 
Multiple attempts to decide (1 or 0) 0.05 0.04 -0.06   
 (0.048) (0.036) (0.073)   
   Chat messages      
I talked first (1 or 0) 0.08 0.09* 0.10 -0.07 0.04 
 (0.066) (0.036) (0.083) (0.129) (0.074) 
I talked last (1 or 0) -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 0.14 -0.11
 (0.058) (0.030) (0.048) (0.103) (0.074) 
Number of words I wrote in my group (x 100) 0.18 -0.19 0.55** 0.04 0.15 
 (0.453) (0.190) (0.210) (0.429) (0.579) 
Number of words that all other members wrote (x 100) -0.38 -0.36** 0.16 -0.49** -0.30 
 (0.253) (0.111) (0.176) (0.181) (0.334) 
   Demographics      
Science and Engineering Major (1 or 0) 0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.29** 0.03 
 (0.079) (0.034) (0.071) (0.103) (0.094) 
Above 75 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.21** 
 (0.059) (0.035) (0.059) (0.138) (0.057) 
Below 25 percentile SAT/ACT (1 or 0) 0.09 0.08** 0.08 -0.00 0.20** 
 (0.076) (0.028) (0.097) (0.085) (0.068) 
Male (1 or 0) -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.17 -0.17* 
 (0.080) (0.041) (0.082) (0.187) (0.084) 
Missing SAT/ACT or demographic data (1 or 0) 0.10 0.06 -0.02 -0.33 0.23** 
 (0.085) (0.033) (0.056) (0.339) (0.084) 
   Personality traits      
Agreeableness 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.05 
 (0.045) (0.029) (0.037) (0.105) (0.055) 
Conscientiousness -0.10 -0.08* 0.01 0.15 -0.11 
 (0.059) (0.038) (0.082) (0.129) (0.083) 
Neuroticism -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.06 
 (0.066) (0.035) (0.053) (0.205) (0.069) 
Openness 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 
 (0.050) (0.027) (0.052) (0.090) (0.056) 
Extroversion -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.20** -0.03
 (0.048) (0.021) (0.056) (0.062) (0.050) 
Number of observations 477 318 159 150 327 
Pseudo R-squared 0.361 0.284 0.205 0.498 0.375 
Log likelihood -204.7 -110.2 -61.23 -49.97 -137.9 
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Notes: marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clusters on groups.  
Statistical significance ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: decisions with disagreement only. The regression includes 
lottery decision dummies, which have not been reported in the table. One group did not agree on 3 lottery decisions 
and those decisions are excluded from this table. 
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TABLE 6 
Probit regression on group difficulty of reaching an agreement 
Sample: decisions with disagreement only 
 
Dependent variable:  
1= my group required more than one attempt to decide; 0= otherwise 
 
Independent variables:  
my proposal was the risk neutral choice (0/1) -0.02 
 (0.068) 
my individual choice was different than my proposal 0.07 
 (0.116) 
my proposals were not monotonic (0/1) 0.40** 
 (0.139) 
number of lotteries with disagreement in the group 0.17** 
 (0.051) 
number of words written overall by group (x 100) -0.57 
 (0.313) 
number of words written in the last intervention (x 100) 0.02 
 (0.020) 
number of words written in the second to last intervention (x 100) 0.04** 
 (0.012) 
difference in words written between the most and the least active individual (x 100) 1.35* 
 (0.617) 
Science and Engineering Major -0.28** 
 (0.104) 
Above 75 percentile SAT/ACT -0.19* 
 (0.076) 
Below 25 percentile SAT/ACT 0.03 
 (0.111) 
Male 0.12 
 (0.088) 
Missing SAT/ACT or demographic data 0.04 
 (0.113) 
Agreeableness -0.01 
 (0.060) 
Conscientiousness -0.14 
 (0.074) 
Neuroticism 0.06 
 (0.073) 
Openness -0.10 
 (0.090) 
Extroversion -0.14* 
 (0.063) 
Observations 477 
Pseudo R-squared 0.523 
Log likelihood -141.8 
 
Notes: marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clusters on groups.  
Statistical significance ** p<0.01, *p<0.05. Sample: decisions with disagreement only. 
The regression includes lottery decision dummies, which have not been reported in the table.  
 
 33
FIGURE 1 
Fraction of risky lottery choices by groups and individuals 
 
 
Notes: N=120. One group did not agree on 3 lottery decisions. For those decisions, the graph employed 
their individual third attempt proposals. Lottery numbers are the same as in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
Disagreement within groups for each lottery (N=600) 
 
 
Notes: lottery numbers are the same as in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Notes: N=40 groups; all groups disagreed on at least one decision; percentages refer to the number  of 
observations, which sums up to 100%. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Notes: “B” is the most frequently used word in the chat (122 times) “DECISION” is the least used (7 times). 
Character size is proportional to frequency of use. 
 
